China and its Discontents

The driving force behind the U.S. deficits and China’s surpluses lies not in exchange rates but in structural factors that built up over time. Three factors largely explain the emergence of China’s trade surpluses: surging U.S. consumption that fueled import demand, maturation of the East Asian production sharing network centered on China, and ratcheting up of China’s savings rates.

The story of the origins of the decline in U.S. household savings rates which was then exacerbated by growing fiscal deficits and together led to the excessive demand for imports is well known and still unresolved. This part of the story has little to do with China, but reflects the political gridlock in Washington.

Yukon Huang, of the Carnegie Endowment and former country director at the World Bank, writes at The Diplomat that the U.S. “must get over” the renminbi. While it is true that China gets the low-added value side of the production chain, and that if counted properly, our trade deficits with Japan, South Korea, et al would be much higher, I think he discounts the role of Chinese state policy in perpetuating the trade deficit. The Chinese, in effect, have subsidized our consumption: all dollars that flow into export businesses must by law be surrendered to the People’s Bank of China, which then invests it right back into U.S. treasuries because it doesn’t know how to spend its money fast enough (there are already questions about the quality of the infrastructure investments China has made). This is one of the primary reasons why the Chinese savings rate is so high–because it’s Chinese state policy. Sure, the average consumer has a high savings rate because of the volatility of the Chinese market (no social security/safety net, very few safe investments so much of those savings flows into real estate or low-interest savings accounts that don’t keep up with inflation–financial market liberalization is a topic for another day). But state-enforced savings far outweigh consumer savings. This investment in Treasury bonds, in turn, aids the U.S. in taking out more debt, and ultimately, for U.S. consumers to buy more things. It’s a vicious cycle of consumption.

Huang does give the right solution, however: increased Chinese consumption. But again, he seems to think this is mostly solved by individual consumers buying more things. He does suggest the Chinese state do one thing: relax the hukou residency permit rules, so that migrant workers can feel more secure in spending more money. This is all well and good (the Chinese hukou system is draconian; the lack of labor mobility is a huge drag on the Chinese economy), but the Chinese state can do a lot more: by spending more of the money it puts into Treasury bonds! If it’s having trouble disbursing the money in the form of infrastructure investments, fine! Use it to create a viable social safety net and universal healthcare! Pay school teachers more! Invest in the Chinese people, rather than trying to build the next big infrastructure monstrosity that will fall apart in five years anyway.

With the release of the Treasury Department’s new white paper on housing policy, the administration has restarted a national discussion on reforming the GSEs (government-sponsored enterprises, Freddy Mac and Fannie Mae). The long and short of it is that they distort the market for mortgages, and contributed to the collapse of the economy by backing risky mortgage securities that later blew up. (they are not however the root cause and creators of those exotic securities; you can thank Wall Street for that) Our bailout of Freddy and Fannie has cost the government far more money than the stimulus or TARP ever cost. This entire set-up is rather strange, given that these are for-profit corporations with an arsenal of lobbyists.

What’s the government’s plan? I got curious when I read Ezra Klein write this bit: “But the government isn’t looking to dramatically change the role they play in the housing market. They’re just looking to get away from poorly designed institutions like Fannie and Freddie.” This seems like a contradiction – and I think he misread the report, although I agree with everything else he wrote in that post. The government’s stake in the mortgage market is going to be substantially altered. As Daniel Indiviglio writes, the government will still subsidize a small portion of mortgages for the poor and veterans through FHA and VA programs, but under any of the options provided by the Treasury Department, the U.S. government will gradually exit the 85% percent of the market it had previously inhabited.

The plan makes GSEs less and less competitive with private sources of funding, gradually winding down its influence on the mortgage market. Fees guaranteeing mortgages will rise, more private capital would need to be raised to cover credit losses, and larger mortgages will not qualify for government-backing. Next, the plan offers three options for a limited government presence on the market: completely private, no government role of any kind; a crisis funding mechanism that is so expensive that during good times it is never used, and in bad times much cheaper to ease a credit crunch; and a catastrophic guarantee reinsurance program. Indiviglio describes this better than I can: “Mortgages would pay a premium to obtain this insurance, but the first losses (up to some specified percentage) would hit whoever held the mortgage asset, whether it be a bank or investor. If losses exceed that first loss piece, then the government would cover the remainder. The government would use the guarantee fees it obtained to do so. That way, theoretically, taxpayers would not be harmed. Think of this as a little like depository insurance, where there’s a fund in place paid for by insurance premiums that the government uses to cover losses.”

This is all good. When it comes to housing policy, one major question will shape how you view all related policies: is universal housing ownership a worthy goal of U.S. government policy? I would say: not in of itself. Owning a house is not a smart decision for every single person. It might be the American dream, but we do more harm than good when we try to force it on people. I would suggest everyone also take a look at the GSE section of the Roosevelt Institute’s 2009 report on financial reform, “Let Markets Be Markets”. There’s a very good lecture from Raj Date included. The full report is here (pdf).